Politicians use different strategies when competing for voters’ support. Among them, we can find how parties and candidates develop linkages with citizens based on charismatic, clientelistic, and programmatic appeals (Kitschelt 2000), which have different implications for democracy. The study of clientelism in Latin America has attracted many scholars in recent years (Stokes 2005, Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012, Hilgers 2012). Most of these studies focus on voters, trying to identify which socio-demographic and political characteristics make citizens targets of clientelistic practices. However, in any electoral process there are two sides, not only the voters but also the candidates. Using survey data from the University of Salamanca´s Latin American Elite Project (PELA), this paper aims to assess how different characteristics of the district – level of development, presence of ethnic communities– affect the probability that legislators engage in clientelistic practices. The survey asks legislators the extent to which they use three different practices when competing for votes: offering consuming goods, job opportunities and benefits for the community. We will assess whether responses to these questions are shaped by socio-demographic and economic characteristics of representatives’ districts. We will focus our analysis on the current Central American legislatures, countries many times left out of studies on clientelism in Latin America.
