The success of anti-immigration parties in many European countries poses a dilemma to the other parties: Boycotting these parties may help neutralize their impact on policy, but these parties may also benefit electorally from such a boycott. We conduct a survey experiment to explore the severity of this dilemma. A representative sample of 1,724 voters in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, is presented with one of several versions of information about the main anti-immigration party, the Freedom Party (PVV). Various pieces of information about other parties’ reaction to the PVV are provided to some respondents (in the treatments groups) but not to others (in the control group). The dependent variable is propensity to vote for the PVV. We find that the effects of boycotting the party depend on the context. If the impact of the cordon is strong, i.e. if expected PVV utility in opposition is lower than expected PVV utility in government, ostracism decreases PVV preferences. Vice versa, if the cordon impact is weak, i.e. if expected utility in opposition is high relative to expected utility in government, ostracism increases PVV preferences. Both effects are quite sizeable.
This is work in progress – please do not cite or quote, thanks!
