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Strange Bedfellows: Lobbying Coalitions of Non-Profit and For-Profit Service Providers

Civil Society
Interest Groups
Social Policy
Welfare State
Peter Starke
Department of Political Science & Public Management, University of Southern Denmark
Peter Starke
Department of Political Science & Public Management, University of Southern Denmark

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of the new regulatory framework centered on contracting and (quasi-)markets on the lobbying behavior of non-profit (and for-profit) social service providers. There are clear signs of a convergence in the regulation of social services across OECD-welfare states, albeit from very different starting points. Independent for-profit and non-profit providers play a central role, today. While they strongly compete for market share, there should be plenty of room for cooperation when it comes to lobbying for positions such as increased state funding. After all, the general constraints and needs of different organizational types should converge under the new competitive framework. Non-profit research, however, suggests, that fundamental differences may persist. What is more, the interest group literature finds that the lobbying strategies of different types of groups tend to differ significantly. At the same time, organizations for good reasons often forge quite heterogeneous lobbying alliances. Based on these literatures, the paper develops a set of hypotheses about lobbying alliances between non-profit and for-profit providers, depending, for example, on organizational coherence, the level of market competition and the type of policy issue. I present some preliminary empirical evidence on organized long-term care providers in Germany (as part of a comparative project). The literature on Germany maintains that direct competition for contracts with for-profits has rendered the behavior of non-profits more business-like in the delivery of services. How this has changed their lobbying behavior and whether organized for-profit providers are directly challenging the political role of existing non-profits or rather join their lobbying efforts, has not been studied so far. The paper finds that cross-sector collaboration is limited and tends to be short-term. It is most likely with regard to volume of state funding and least likely when it comes to regulatory questions of service monitoring and working conditions.