Is it morally permissible to discount future well-being? That of course depends on what discounting is, and there is in fact much disagreement on that issue. To facilitate mutual understanding, this paper provides an overview of the relevant conceptual landscape. I will draw five key distinctions, all of which I take (with a few refinements) from the work of John Broome. The central distinction is that between the axiological (i.e. the domain of goodness or value) and the normative (i.e. the domain concerning what ought to be done). I shall then distinguish between axiological discounting (which Broome calls "axiological partiality") and normative discounting, and I will stress the immense importance of being clear about which kind of discounting one is concerned with.
With this background in place, I will illustrate just how easy it is for participants in this debate to talk past one another. I will do so by arguing that Broome himself misconstrues the views on discounting held by Derek Parfit and Kenneth Arrow. According to Broome, Parfit and Arrow both embrace versions of axiological discounting. Yet I will show that there is very little evidence to support this reading, and indeed much evidence to the contrary. Pace Broome, Parfit and Arrow are better interpreted as endorsing normative discounting only. Since normative discounting is much more plausible than axiological discounting (as Broome acknowledges and as I demonstrate with toy examples), Parfit’s and Arrow’s views are much more plausible than Broome’s reading would allow.
My discussion aims to show that one can master the relevant philosophical distinctions and yet still be given to dialectical misunderstanding. This paper aims to help us achieve the former while avoiding the latter.
