Following the framework set out in the workshop’s description, this paper will consist of an in-depth empirical study of a single case: the response of the Greek political elites to the rise of the extreme right in the last decade. This rise was largely concurrent with the Greek debt crisis and profound recession, causing fears that Greek democracy may deteriorate down a path similar to that of Weimar Germany. The paper’s approach will not be comparative between countries but will include within-case comparison of two Greek parties: the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), which managed to break into parliament in 2007, joined a government coalition in 2011 and failed to reenter parliament in 2012; and the more extremist Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avgi), which had been marginal until LAOS’ demise, entered parliament after the 2012 elections, and is currently under investigation for forming a criminal organization—this legal avenue was chosen by judicial authorities because, unlike Germany and Turkey, Greece’s constitutional framework does not contain provisions for closing down political parties. The paper will treat three interrelated empirical questions, with obvious reflections on theory: 1) what explains the ebb and flow of LAOS’s and Golden Dawn’s electoral fortunes? Particularly, what role has the Greek debt crisis and “repression” (or lack thereof) played in comparison to standard anti-immigrant racism? 2) What explains the response of the two mainstream political parties (conservative New Democracy and socialist PASOK) to the rise of the far right, their original shunning but later cooperation with LAOS vs. the cordon-and-ban strategy towards Golden Dawn? 3) How did the established parties of the far left (SYRIZA and the Communist Party of Greece) respond to the challenge of the far right, considering the historical legacy of the Greek Civil War and the Cold War ban on the Greek Communist Party?
