Filling the Gender Quota: Aspirant Characteristics and Political Recruitment in Mexico

In Mexico, highly institutionalized and programmatic political parties must follow a strict 40 percent gender quota law. Political parties, then, must run women—but which ones? This paper explores how practices of candidate recruitment privilege certain aspirant characteristics over others, with notable gendered effects. The Mexican case presents several features useful for this study. First, the bicameral congress is elected using single-member districts and closed-PR lists at the state, regional, and national levels. Since the quota applies to all races, candidate types can be compared: do certain characteristics qualify women to contest majoritarian races when compared to PR races? Second, the constitution prohibits immediate reelection, thus eliminating the incumbency advantage. Third, recent jurisprudence struck down the quota law’s infamous exemption for parties that practice internal primaries, and primaries are now used universally. How, then, do female aspirants fare in internal elections, both for majoritarian races and for PR races? When the quota must be met, how do party leaders choose to reorder primary results? This paper answers these questions by using quantitative candidate data and qualitative interview data from the 2012 congressional elections. Preliminary findings reveal that Mexico’s mixed system, when combined with party primaries, affects women differently. Female aspirants who most resemble traditional male politicians—that is, women with access to neighborhood-based clientelistic networks—become candidates in majoritarian districts. By contrast, female aspirants who most differ from traditional male politicians—that is, women who are young, indigenous, handicapped, or otherwise “diverse”—become candidates on PR lists. These aspirant characteristics also affect party leaders’ decisions when primary results must be reordered to meet the quota, though diversity proves more advantageous for female aspirants than male aspirants. In sum, the Mexican case shows that electoral institutions and party strategies impact descriptive representation in terms of which women are ultimately elected.