Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), defined as a system of horizontal and vertical cooperation between federal and subnational governments, respond to a need for coordination in nowadays’ federations, shaped by interdependence rather than independence (Bolleyer/Thorlakson 2012). In fact, a large number of intergovernmental bodies have been created in most federations since the second half of the 20th century. Ensuring intergovernmental cooperation is one of the main challenges federations are facing, as the governments’ engagement is always a voluntary one. This paper presents a typology of IGR regimes based on a comparative analysis of IGR in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. It enhances Bednar’s (2009) concept of federal robustness by adding IGR to the list of federal safeguards. I argue that IGR can be a strong structural safeguard, able to cover all three types of opportunism identified by Bednar.
