The Financial Stability Board in the Transatlantic. Can Historical Institutionalism Account for Change in the Regulatory Framework Concerning Financial Services?

International relations scholarship has difficulties in interpreting the 2009 established Financial Stability Board (FSB). My paper proposes that historical institutionalism advances the debate on change and continuity in international cooperation. Since regulatory policies in the United States now resonate more closely with European positions, it is my understanding that the FSB is a manifestation of a crisis-induced preference change in the U.S. and has significantly influenced transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Drawing on domestic sources of financial services supervision in both the EU and the U.S., historical institutionalism looks beyond conceptualizations based on relative or absolute gains. I will demonstrate that sequencing can clarify the complex dynamic that has led relevant agents to shift regulatory frameworks from indirect market-based approaches to a system of direct and prescriptive macroprudential oversight. Having established new path-dependencies in how to govern international finance, the FSB represents a major adjustment in international regulatory cooperation.