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Accountability and the Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies

Media
Public Policy
Regulation
Jan Biela
Université de Lausanne
Jan Biela
Université de Lausanne
Fabrizio Gilardi
University of Zurich
Martino Maggetti
Université de Lausanne
Yannis Papadopoulos
Université de Lausanne

Abstract

Since independent agencies became key actors in European regulatory governance in the 1990s, a significant share of policy-making has been carried out by organizations that are neither democratically elected nor directly accountable to elected politicians. In this context, communication structures and strategies are extremely important for agencies. Political communication contributes to the accountability of agencies and may thereby help them reinforce their legitimacy towards democratic institutions, regulated industries, other regulators, and other stakeholders. On the one hand, agencies communicate directly with their target groups (notably, regulated firms); on the other hand, they rely on the media to convey their messages to the public. Both strategies can be a means for agencies to strengthen their accountability, but also to pursue other goals, such as steering the behaviour of target groups. However, empirical research focusing directly on how regulators communicate is virtually nonexistent in political science. To tackle this question, this contribution uses a compound research design (the combination of cross-national and cross-sectoral comparisons) to explore the targets, goals, instruments, content, and perceived success of agencies' communication in four countries and three sectors. The selected cases are the British, Irish, German and Swiss agencies regulating broadcasting, telecommunications and the financial sector. Data are collected with face-to-face semi-directive interviews and content analysis of press releases and other media.