Our multilateral system is replete with international institutions that are dominated by a handful of mostly Western countries, on the one hand, but have a global mission or a desire to shape global outcomes, on the other.
Their ambition to shape global governance inevitably conflicts with the fact that other major players are either deprived from equal treatment in decision-making (e.g., UNSC, IMF, and World Bank), or excluded from membership altogether (e.g., OECD, IEA, and G8). This state of affairs has given way to an anachronistic multilateral architecture cracking under the ongoing geopolitical tectonic shifts. As a result, questions concerning effectiveness, legitimacy, and relevance abound, and the authority of these institutions is increasingly challenged and contested.
Over the past decades and particularly in recent years, most of the concerned institutions have begun to deploy an intriguing set of strategies to cope with these tensions and to adapt. These range from non-committal dialogue with non-members, over sustained, issue-driven cooperation with important outsiders and partnerships with other institutions (such as the UN and G20), to internal governance reform or full-fledged membership expansion. Our current research project aims to understand the variance in these outcomes, and to explain common patterns and meaningful differences.
Our paper will provide a first exploration of the field based on existing literature and own research. In addition, it will present a framework of analysis with relevant variables which allow to deconstruct this quite complex research field. Due attention will be paid to items such as the high variety in interests of “incumbents” and “outsiders” and divisions within these groups, the impact of gradual or sudden changes in the external context (such as the end of the Cold War or financial crises), the role of government change within individual member states, and of course the variety of adaptation strategies.
