Many IOs pass similar norms in subsequent negotiations. The United Nations General Assembly is no exception as many of its resolutions are reoccurring over time. Drawing on a unique, novel dataset on repeated resolutions UNGA reveals that voting consistency varies across states. The paper develops a theoretical push-pull vote-shift model combing domestic (push) and international (pull) explanations for vote-shifts and puts the hypotheses to a comprehensive empirical test. This reveals that both domestic push and international pull factors are at play. Most notably, states with limited financial capacities cannot develop their own, principled voting positions on all UN resolutions, instead prioritizing those few which most impact their national interests. In addition, regime type changes as well as domestic events and responsiveness to international-level factors, such as development aid and socialization into UN norms, influence a state’s propensity to update voting stances and to shift their vote in the UNGA.
