When the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was drafted, many states argued that the envisioned Court would have to be guided by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, well into the drafting process the ideal balance between the exercise of the UNSC’s mandate and the desired impartiality of the ICC’s proceedings remained heavily contested. Only during the final days of the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998, the drafters conceded that the UNSC would be permitted to positively and negatively intervene in the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. Essentially, the Security Council was given the discretionary authority (1) to refer situations to the ICC’s Prosecutor for investigation as well as (2) to request the Court not to commence or proceed with an investigation or prosecution for a renewable period of twelve months. The manner in which this designed relationship between the UNSC and the ICC has played out in practice has raised strong concerns among many of the ICC’s States Parties and has recently instigated proposals for institutional reform. The first part of this paper maps the concerns raised within the Security Council, the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties and regional bodies like the African Union and contends that the current relationship between the two institutions is complex in nature and as such fails to provide an adequate framework to balance the imperatives of security and justice within the international realm. Subsequently, the second part of the paper seeks to evaluate the suggested opportunities for institutional reform.
