Short-Term and Long-Term Effects of Constitution-Making Patterns

Rigid comparative analyses of constitution-making are seldomly connected with studies of the long-term functioning of these constitutions. Therefore, we are faced with more hypotheses than hard evidence. The paper strives to fill this gap. It is based on an empirical study of constitution-making in the new federal states of Germany after 1989. This methodological design guarantees a similar societal, political, economic and cultural context of the cases, whereas the political constellations within their founding parliaments varied. The paper summarizes the systematic effects of these differences on the adoption process and contents of the new constitutions and then observes whether and how these differences influenced the functioning, acceptance and later amendments of the different constitutions in their similar contexts. It shows that the pattern of constitution-making affects the long-term interrelationship of the political elites and the amendment rates while other factors temper their effects on the general acceptance of the constitution.