National Parties as Principals: On the Connection Between Legislative Behaviour and Candidate List Placement of German MEPs

Previous studies suggest that when voting Members of European Parliament (MEPs) are more responsive to the preferences of their national parties than to those of their EP party group (Hix 2002, Hix et al 2007, Faas 2003), though the mechanisms underlying this pattern remain unclear. One posited explanation for this behavior is that national parties use their selection power to punish or reward voting behavior through placements on election lists. Using a unique dataset of German MEPs from 1999-2009 containing candidate list positions as well as personal and behavioral data, I examine the evidence for this hypothesis. The German case is unusual in that multiple candidate selection mechanisms (both formal and informal) are used in the same closed list electoral system, allowing researchers to determine the effect of electoral politics on list placement. Contrary to popular claims, I find little evidence that parties enforce voting behavior through list placements, but some evidence that list placements in part reflect on the relationship between MEPs and local party leaders.