Russia’s “Near Abroad” is a contentious region, within which the competitive friction between the European Union (EU) and Russia is a high-stakes political power game and the resurgence of a 19th century “Great Game.” Within the Caucasus, questions presiding over the establishment of zones of influence and political control have assumed a leading position in the on-going debate over the reorganization of the European “Common Neighbourhood” and the geopolitical positions of the EU and Russia as a whole. Shunning the term “Common Neighbourhood,” Russia has pursued its own agenda in what it refers to as the “regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders” or the expanse comprised of the former Republics of the USSR. In the last ten years, Russia has not been reticent about its intentions to defend this territory. This paper assesses the European Union (EU) and Russian approaches to the “Common Neighbourhood,” and considers key factors in EU and Russian power projection in the South Caucasus. It examines elements that specifically drive Armenia closer to Russia and the EU’s efforts to balance this through its own external governance. In doing so, it looks at a range of “carrots” and “sticks” that both the EU and Russia, as geopolitical actors, employ to gain traction into this shared space. A theoretical framework of geopolitical strategies is employed to establish the context in which both the EU and Russia operate with respect to the South Caucasus, and establishes the basis for understanding how both actors respond to one another in their respective attempts to exert their dominance in the region. The argument is made that despite protracted efforts by the EU to establish its influence over the South Caucasus more generally, Russia’s geostrategic posture is better suited to secure a true and concrete zone of influence within the region.
