This paper investigates how the ‘Sejdic-Finci’ ruling has impacted the politics of corruption in BiH. The 2009 ECHR ‘Sejdic-Finci’ ruling deemed parts of BiH’s constitution discriminatory towards minorities (it was designed to safeguard peace by maintaining a power balance between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs). The paper argues that the ruling triggered a constitutional and political deadlock that was used by domestic elites as an opportunity to maintain the status-quo, advance regressive reforms for personal benefit, and derail the liberal state-building agenda. What were the domestic dynamics behind the ‘Sejdic-Finci’ deadlock, and what were the consequences for anti-corruption efforts? Using an institutionalist toolset and process-tracing techniques, the paper contends that ‘Sejdic-Finci’ reveals the inherent contradictions between promoting technical and political reforms, as proposed by the 'institutionalisation-before-liberalisation' state-building stratagem. It thus seeks to contribute to debates on the unintended consequences of international state-building, and the relation between state-building and corruption.
