This paper shows how the EU’s diplomatic practices with third countries are the result of complex relations between the Commission and member States and within the European Commission. Based on the case of negotiations on readmission (for the facilitation of deportation) with Morocco, it concentrates on the relations between the different Directorates in charge of negotiations (mainly Home affairs and the EEAS) and with member States. I concentrate on the issue of incentives: financial incentives, usually considered an obvious part of negotiations, are in fact difficult to secure by negotiators and largely depend on internal negotiations for their labelling (rather than budgeting). Substantial incentives have been put forward: the adoption of the ‘global approach’ in 2005, and more recently through the adoption of visa facilitation as incentives, were the result of a ‘constructive ambiguity’ (Hoffman 1995; Mérand and Jegen 2013) between various Directorates, member States and third countries.
