The demise of the Western European Union Security and Defence Assembly (WEU-ESDA) in 2011 left the European Union without the main de facto mechanism through which inter-parliamentary oversight of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) had hitherto been organised. Anticipating this development, the Treaty of Lisbon thus made explicit provision for an inter-parliamentary conference to scrutinise foreign and security policy matters. However, the specific contours and structure of such a conference were left very vague, with no indication as to the appropriate level of involvement of national parliaments and the European Parliament (EP). As a result, negotiations between the EP and national parliaments over the new structure for the Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairs (COFACC) quickly proved difficult and contentious.
This paper will explore the prospects for inter-parliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the context of these new arrangements, highlighting the unique obstacles to inter-institutional cooperation in the non-legislative but often fast-moving field of foreign and security policy. How can parliaments cooperate effectively in an area where many have very limited formal powers, and does cooperation offer a way for parliaments to become more effective at home in monitoring and constraining their own governments? What should be the role of the EP, given that the military aspect of CSDP remains, in theory, governed by unanimity at European level? Moreover, at a time of tightening budgets across Europe, does inter-parliamentary cooperation offer any prospects for developing a more streamlined, cost-effective CFSP?
