How do post-communist autocrats deal with unexpected manifestations of off-bench judicial resistance against improper interference? Drawing on judicial politics in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Russia, his paper develops a novel argument that this underexplored type of resistance is a highly risky off-bench behavior fraught with failures. Yet it reflects the degree of actual judicial autonomy, which, in turn, is a function of social ties judges have with various actors outside the courthouses. Autocrats use formal and informal mechanisms of co-optation of and pressure on resisting judges through: 1) strengthening judges’ ties with the autocratic patronage networks; 2) reducing the effectiveness of judges’ connections with those actors, who could threaten autocratic patronage networks; and 3) punishing careers of recalcitrant judges. The practices of coping with pressure and resisting the interference test the limits of actual judicial autonomy. Both autocrats and resisting judges learn about these limits and may modify “interference-resistance” relationship.
