The Puzzle of Double European Union Referendums

If voters are asked to vote twice on the same issue in a single year, why might they initially reject the proposal but then vote to approve it the second time? This has happened three times in European Union referendums (Denmark on Maastricht Treaty in 1992-1993; Ireland on Nice Treaty in 2001-2002, and Lisbon Treaty in 2008-2009). So far these second referendums have all been successful. No work has compared all six of these referendum campaigns. Strategic No campaigns typically argue that treaty ratification would increase immigration and Islamization, cause rising unemployment, destroy the welfare state model, undermine national sovereignty and identity, introduce conscription to an EU army or even weaken domestic laws on abortion or taxation. In this paper, I ask: Given the success of these No campaigns in the first rounds, how do the Yes campaigners reverse public opinion in the second rounds? Based on fieldwork in Denmark and Ireland, 50 in-depth interviews with campaigners and public opinion data from all cases, I show that the way political actors presented the EU to their public within the referendum debates matters. The Yes campaigners learned from their mistakes and changed campaign strategies in the second rounds. Not only they secured guarantees from the EU to neutralize the No side’s arguments, but also they used more emotional campaign arguments in the second campaigns. Such swings in public opinion have crucial implications as they put the future of European integration at stake.