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Global Crisis Manager or Modest Partner?

Conflict Resolution
Foreign Policy
Governance
Institutions
International Relations
NATO
Security
Clara Egger
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Clara Egger
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Abstract

NATO’s experience in ISAF can be considered in many regards as a unique operation in the history of the organization. It was the first time the alliance implemented an ambitious nation-building program which implies coordinating its activities with a wide range of other actors. Assessing the lessons learnt by NATO in Afghanistan will provide perspectives on NATO’s role and missions in the future. This communication will strive to answer this question by putting the evolution of NATO into perspective. More especially, it is essential to examine how NATO’s involvement in the Balkans (and in particular in Kosovo) has shaped the way the organization perceives its role in global crisis-management. This historical perspective will help understanding the choices that have been made in Afghanistan. In particular, the communication will focus on how NATO develops and implements its own vision of crisis-management around the concept of comprehensive approach. This approach, at the core of several Strategic Concepts, not only defines what NATO aims to do in crisis-management but also how it positions itself with regards to other actors involved in crisis-management activities (mainly the EU and the UN). Putting the emphasis on how the comprehensive approach develops also enables to understand the role of key Member States in shaping NATO’s future. In this regard, we will focus on the position defended by the France, Germany, the UK and the US. Finally, this communication will also examine what could be the perspectives for NATO beyond 2014. Studying alternatives implies analyzing the other missions NATO implements in the Horn of Africa, since these missions are characterized by a more modest agenda. This paper will draw on extensive empirical data collected through interviews in the field (Kosovo, Kenya) but also with NATO’s decision makers in headquarters.