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‘Tell-Tale Tit, Your Tongue Shall Be Split’ − Possibilities and Limitations for Whistle-Blowing to Combat Corruption in Public Administration: The Baltic States

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Comparative Politics
Public Administration
Social Capital
Karin Hilmer Pedersen
Aarhus Universitet
Lars Johannsen
Aarhus Universitet
Karin Hilmer Pedersen
Aarhus Universitet

Abstract

This paper examines the individual civil servant’s inclination to blow the whistle. We suggest that whistle-blowing can be seen as vertical accountability but have to be considered in relation with horizontal accountability that is the formal legislation and arrangements. International anti-corruption organizations and convention alike urges countries to adopt a legal framework that protects whistle-blowers and/or provide ways in which malpractice can be reported anonymously. Whistle-blowers can play a crucial role in protecting the public interest against ‘illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices’ (Near, Baucus & Miceli 1993; 204), but despite the merit not all dare do it as whistle-blowers may face retaliation from the organization or from their colleagues (Dasgupta & Kesharwane 2010). Retaliation on whistleblowers are often explained by the organizational structure and culture of public administration itself that is the whistle blowers are seen as dissidents breaking the hierarchy of public administration or are disloyal to the organization. Despite formal encouragement to spell the beans informal norms and rewards systems may discourage it (Miceli & Near 1994). Moreover, in post-communist countries whistle-blowing may remind people of KGB snitches (Saarnitt 2009; 12). Reporting malpractice is, however, not a question of either or as there is several possibilities available, both internally and externally, to the potential whistle-blower. Empirically we use a survey of 1.700 civil servants (2011).We asked if and to whom they would report a colleague they knew accepted bribes. The present paper explains this by organizational structure, the existence of institutional and social informal sanctions i.e. the likely retaliation they would face if reporting wrongdoing and the severity of malpractice found within the organization. The three Baltic states provide a research design holding several background variables constant, including the legacy of communism while differing with respect to the legal protection of whistleblowers (Palidauskaite et.al. 2010).