Interest Group Influence in European Union Agencies: Conceptualisation and Measurement of Influence 

As acknowledged by scholars on interest groups and lobbying, few studies have attempted to measure influence of interest groups, given the methodological difficulties in its operationalization. This paper seeks to contribute to the scholarship on interest groups and lobbying by developing an analytical approach to define and measure interest groups’ influence on the decision-making of EU agencies through the analysis of the information used by decision makers. EU agencies have a significant impact on the design of policies –such as for food security, financial markets, evaluation of medicinal products, and management of the Union’s external borders, among others– that are implemented in the Member States. The research question is: to what extent is public policy decision-making of EU agencies influenced by interest groups? Firstly, in order to answer the research question, this paper develops an analytical framework to assess interest group influence on decision-making of European Union agencies. In particular, through the measurement of two dimensions of influence: a) formal dimension, through the analysis of the institutional design of EU agencies in order to identify the degree of involvement of interest groups in the activities carried out by these agencies – such as the participation of interest groups representatives in the management boards or in the scientific panels –, and b) de facto dimension, through identification of the information, coming from interest groups, that was used by decision-makers of EU-agencies. Secondly, based on current literature on interest groups and lobbying, this paper identifies the “typology” of the interest groups involved in the EU agencies lobbying (e.g., business associations, citizens’ groups, professional associations), as well as their “geographical level” of mobilisation (e.g, national, subnational, EU level, European –not EU–, International –not European–).