In his book “The Baltic Revolution”, Anatole Lieven writes, “dealing with Lithuanian nationalist politicians during the second independence struggle, I was repeatedly made aware that they operate just partly in the present”. This remark can lead us to tow different questions. On the one side, many specialists of Baltic studies admit that there is a kind of Baltic “hypermnesia”. For thirty years now, the Baltic struggle for independence from Russia was mainly based on historical arguments, while the struggle for the first independence after the World War I was mainly based on the right for self-determination. One should therefore investigate why History has become such a salient issue between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and how the historical argument is used on the Baltic side. This can lead us to discuss the use of history in modern diplomacy. One can also discover that, after the Baltic accession to EU and NATO, the scope of historical arguments used in foreign speeches widen to integrate medieval and First World War narratives.
For the realist theory, balance of power is the main determinant of international relations, and powerful states are the only ones to shape history and, then, use it to legitimate their actions. The constructivist theory relies more on ideas, and history is very important, in this perspective. But one needs, therefore, to make a distinction between history as a context and history as a tool used by politicians and diplomats. In this paper, we will try to see what are the main explanations for the choice of one historical event to be used in foreign relations and what can explain the post-2004 shift.
