Parties often face competing demands when it comes to their participation in government coalitions. Coalition options that follow from the election result of the general public might be unavailable when there is pronounced ideological heterogeneity among intra-party groups. Using longitudinal data from the Italian case, Ceron (2014) has recently shown that intra-party conflict does not mitigate a party’s chances of getting into government when party leaders have a high degree of autonomy and authority. This paper develops the argument further. Quantitative analyses of election manifestos, in conjunction with a novel expert survey data set on Intra-Party Democracy, enable (1) evaluating the generalizability of the conditional effect of ideological heterogeneity and intra-party democracy by cross-sectionally comparing coalition formation in 16 Western European Countries, (2) inspecting the underlying causal mechanism by further distinguishing the effect of different dimensions of Intra-Party Democracy and, (3) reflecting on the consequences for party responsiveness. [Alternatively: S35]
