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Fairness and Efficiency in the Organ Market

Institutions
Political Theory
Social Justice
Andreas Albertsen
Aarhus Universitet
Andreas Albertsen
Aarhus Universitet

Abstract

The shortage in organs available for transplants causes immense suffering. This raises questions regarding which public policies we should introduce to do away with this. One proposal is to establish a market for organs (Richards 2012). Actual experience with such a market is limited; Iran provides an example of a highly regulated market, while existing black markets provides another reference point (Goodwin, 2006). Two line of thoughts are prominent in the debate. One is that this solution involves considerable harm to those selling organs (Koplin, 2004), while the other is the oft repeated claim that organ market is efficient. This article discuss different ways of introducing the organ market, and evaluates them in light of arguments related to harm and efficiency. It also discuss whether some advantages could be achieved by other means (i.e. paying for funeral expenses, or tax reductions for donors).