The development of al-Qaeda and Islamic State Organisation franchises across the Middle East has questioned the diffusion of their respective theologico-political outlooks to existing militant groups. While the academic literature has hitherto explored these groups' rationale based on cost-benefit calculus and the role of the internet in magnifying AQ and ISO frame resonance, this paper examines the organisational characteristics favouring or obstructing franchising with external actors. Drawing on a comparative case-study research between the Egyptian Islamic and Jihad Groups (who respectively endorsed and opposed an alliance with al-Qaeda) based on field interviews, this research contends that, more than strategic necessity or ideological affinity, militant groups' organisational dynamics have a preponderant role in their potential franchising and adoption of new theologico-political outlooks. This paper demonstrates that frame diffusion and franchising are inherently related to militant groups' norms of decision making, collective group identity and internal organisational making.
