The paper builds on the observation that there are two types of how senior and junior partners in coalition governments organize for the making of foreign policy. These types shape the pathways of junior partner influence on coalition decision-making as well as the effects of this influence. In the first type, junior partners hold one or more departments in foreign affairs, and their influence rests on the powers that controlling ministries in the field brings. In the second type, junior partners do not hold any department in foreign affairs, and their influence comes from their ability to constrain the foreign policy discretion of the senior partner. Against this background, the paper investigates the conditions under which coalition partners settle for the first or – less commonly – the second type of set-up. Specifically, the type of coalition arrangement will be traced back to the interplay between the institutional context of coalition negotiations; the bargaining power of the senior and junior partners at the coalition formation stage; their expected political payoffs from holding different departments; and the intensity of and distance between their foreign policy preferences. The paper tests its theoretical contentions in comparative analyses of selected coalition governments across Europe.
