Multilateral approval through the UN or regional organizations such as NATO is often considered inherently desirable for humanitarian intervention because it comes close to expressing the “general will” of international society. Critics retort that existing multilateral institutions are dominated by powerful states who often bully and bribe other members; furthermore, multilateralism introduces severe coordination costs and is frequently a recipe for “too little, too late.” This paper offers a rebuttal to those critiques, developing a cautious rule-consequentialist defense of the requirement for multilateral approval: first, it reduces the “moral hazard” of humanitarian intervention; second, it favors deliberative analysis, reducing epistemic problems related to the identification of a just cause; and third, it helps overcome domestic political obstacles to sustained coalition burden sharing, increasing the odds of successful peacebuilding. Three short case studies illustrate the argument. The paper concludes by identifying key traits of an optimal authorization procedure in ideal theory.
