In our paper we aim to analyze the main factors that explain one of the dimensions of the parliamentary professionalization in Spain. Political representatives develop their activity in a structure of political opportunity that provides incentives and constrains for their everyday activity: Chamber Standing Orders, Parliamentary Parties Statutes, electoral system, cohesiveness and hierarchical traits of political parties work as strong factors for the control of political parties exert over MPs, in order to fulfill their functions as strong gatekeepers and providers for allocation of positions, co-ordination and guidance providers for their MPs.
One of the traits of professionalization of MPs is their specialization in a given policy domain: that, apparently, would provide them with a political capital that could be used in their political career in their party. But, against odds, Spanish MPs do not seem to have much interest in becoming specialized in a given policy field and, if they do, they do not seem to be willing to take profit of that expertise: the rotation among different parliamentary committees is really high, even among those who hold positions in the committees’ board. That points to a different incentive structure in Spanish Legislature, which has nothing to do with specialization as a trait of professionalization.
In our paper we check the continuity and change rates of senior MPs among parliamentary committees in Spanish Legislature along time. And we explore different explanations for the remarkable low levels of continuity of senior MPs in the same committee they worked in the previous Legislature. Our results point to low levels of expertise and, therefore, professionalization of Spanish MPs, in terms of expertise in a policy field. They may be senior and expert MPs, even if they are not specialized experts in substantive political field.
