The theory of democracy links the assessment of political legitimacy to two sorts of criteria. First, the political decision must reflect the interests expressed by the social space. Second, the political decision must reflect the common good, which relies upon a rational making-process.
These two conceptions are subject to contention but converge however on the point that publicity is a political virtue that has to be pursued to this end, and which is descriptively and normatively opposed to secrecy and lying. A closer look at the notion of political publicity reveals however a number of difficulties. Envisaging the case of an extraparliamentary binding decision process (ex: constitutional reform or government-making negotiation process, intra-majority arbitration process), the first part of my presentation shows that publicity can harm the application of these criteria. Publicity can – paradoxically - obscure the informational process of the citizen. It can hinder the production of a rational deliberation. And it may not necessarily ensure that the outcome of the decision mirrors the interests of citizens better than secrecy.
Is there thus a good reason left to justify the principle of publicity? The second part of my paper shows why/when the principle of publicity ought to be justified despite its possible negative effects on deliberation. It shows that the justification of publicity could bring us to rebrand the definition of a political regime – or reversely, how rebranding the definition of a political regime could justify publicity despite the objections the principle has to face. Finally, it envisages how such a political regime would reframe the notion of political fairness, and what kind of publicity an extraparliamentary binding decision process would have to comply with. My presentation analyzes why publicity and political lying are justifiable on the same grounds as a legitimate political regime.
