An Elite Bargaining Model of Civil War Onset

A bargaining game between elite groups has the potential to explain a macro phenomena such as a civil war. Fearon (1995) explores the rationalist explanations of war, in which credible commitments and information asymmetries explain the triggering of conflicts internationally. This paper argues that horizontally unequal elites bargain for (re)distribution of political participation, economic assets and social services through formal and informal institutions in order to expand their shares. The presence of cleavages and grievances amongst groups are enhanced when exclusion through inefficient redistribution takes place; therefore, a bargain failure with the potential to active violent means, implies a disagreement amongst the elites over the allocation of resources to different societal groups. By conducting fsQCA the theory will show that bargains fail in presence of information asymmetries and non credible commitments, which can be analysed in: the formal structures as the state itself and, the informal structures as neopatrimonial networks.