The paper critically engages normative and metanormative pluralism that figures among the core self-understandings of political theory, using the concept and theoretical milieu of democracy to illustrate some important concerns. I discuss reasons both internal and external to political theory why unbounded pluralism should signal a worry. I then overview several major attempts to deal productively both with the fact of real-world pluralism and the polyphony of the discipline, arguing that due to its contestatory nature, no definite closure “from within” is likely. To avoid either resignation or self-complacency, I suggest a metatheoretical step aside, one that entails engaging more seriously with the problem of justification of power and coercion. I finally explore the justificatory approach pursued by, among others, Gerald Gaus, and argue that its broadly libertarian conclusions, coupled with a “qualified-majority view” of democratic legislation, constitute a persuasive, not least because systematic, answer to the worry identified previously.
