The High Representative's Dilemmas: Assessing Catherine Ashton's Role in Egypt During the Arab Spring

The turmoil in the Middle Eastern and Northern African Region (MENA) has put to test the policy-making structure introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The existing literature explains the slow EU response to the Arab transition attributing it to the personal characteristics of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; the relatively new institutional construction being in place; or, more in general, to the inability of the EU as a whole to leave behind its shoulders its “civilian power” qualifying features. Although these explanations are worthy of consideration, this article argues that the origins of such uncertain, mostly ineffective, response can be found in a compromise that occurred in 1992 when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. This compromise, between the pressure to extend the integration process to sensitive policies, such as EU foreign and security, and the need to preserve the role of national governments in collectively deciding them, resulted in the emergence of an intergovernmental union. Such argument will be assessed empirically through an analysis of the unfolding of EU approach to the crises in Egypt and in Libya.