This paper analyses the EMU deepening debate, starting from the 2010 taskforce on economic governance up to the June 2015 five presidents report. We seek to explain how, when and why it was transformed from an intergovernmental crisis-management into an institution-led integration process. There have been many analyses of the individual crisis management instruments (the usual suspects of EFSF, ESM, six pack, two pack, fiscal compact, banking union). However, the overall deepening debate, pivoting around the four presidents framework, has been somewhat ignored.
We use an historical institutionalist (HI) perspective, focusing on the central claim of actors (i.e. member states and institutions) losing control over the process and being unable to reassert this control. We combine the four central elements of HI: windows of opportunity, critical junctures, path dependency and unanticipated consequences.
The analysis is based on insider recollections, participatory observations and in-depth interviews with key participants from the five institutions: European Council presidency, ECB, Commission (cabinets and services), Eurogroup (ECF and EWG), and Council secretariat. The fieldwork was conducted in cooperation with the EFC secretariat and the Council secretariat (Directorate 1 for Economic and Financial Affairs).
On a theoretical level this paper contributes to the debate between intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism and supranationalism about the course of European integration. This by carefully distinguishing between the claims they make about member states and institutional control over the (EMU reform) process. The paper seeks to identify which aspects HI can and cannot explain. We argue that a compelling HI argument requires all four elements to be present. In the first two phases of EMU reform that we distinguish, path dependency is the missing element, in the third phase there was no critical juncture, while in the final phase there was no window of opportunity.
