Monitoring the Commission Expert Groups: the EU’s Transparency Paradox

Criticism of the EU is frequently framed in terms of its supposed lack of accountability and the claim that it is out of touch with its citizens. To counter this, the EU makes increasing use of online systems to render its working practices visible, arguing that transparency is one of few means for the EU to connect with its citizens. Drawing on 63 interviews with EU officials, elected representatives, Brussels-based transparency campaigners and representatives of business interests, this paper is an empirical study of recent enhancements in EU transparency processes. The paper argues that new online transparency tools, designed and introduced to reduce a perceived gap between the EU and its citizens, have frequently been introduced without a reliable and consistent quality assurance process to ensure the accuracy of the information placed in the public domain. Moreover, the paper shows that this is a deliberate policy, with the European Commission openly acknowledging its reliance on public-control to police the information it provides through its transparency systems. The paper demonstrates that this public-control is actually undertaken by proxy groups on behalf of the public. It argues that this creates a transparency paradox where the systems designed to increase public confidence in the institutions are used by campaigning groups to erode this confidence. It charts the involvement of two such groups that regularly monitor the Commission’s online registers, providing a first-hand account of the tactics they used to maximise the profile of any irregularities in pursuit of their wider campaigning goals. The paper argues that the transparency paradox, ultimately a function of the EU’s poor in-house quality control processes, constitutes a material weakness in the EU’s transparency regime.