The Implementation of the REACH Authorization Procedure: A Case of Implementation Incongruence?

The REACH regulation reformed the EU chemicals policy by introducing the authorization procedure for Substances of Very High Concern (SVHCs). It aimed to rectify failures of the previous regulatory framework that was characterized by lack of information on substances and cumbersome and ineffective procedures to deal with SVHCs. Although there are important differences from pharmaceuticals and GMOs, research on these authorization procedures provides for interesting clues regarding the analysis of REACH. While pharmaceuticals are authorized through efficient decision making, GMO authorization is characterized by implementation incongruence, i.e. producing policy output which does not conform to its policy objectives and whereby the high level of politicization led to a re-nationalization of competences. Although SVHC authorization under REACH is not politicized to the same extent, the respective policy output likewise qualifies as incongruent implementation, leading to the following research question: How can this policy output be explained and which causal mechanism contributes to implementation incongruence? The conceptual framework is inspired by the classic work of Pressmann and Wildavsky on implementation failure, adjusted in light of the theoretical developments in implementation research in the last decades. Despite its normative top-down approach, the importance of decision making sequences to produce policy output and the respective clearing points along this sequence remain valid theoretical assumptions. By relying on existing theories, the aim is to utilize the implementation of the REACH authorization procedure to refine the conditions, and thereby modify the conceptual framework, through which causal mechanism lead to implementation incongruence. The analysis is devised as a theory-testing case study. Grounded in comparative analysis of pharmaceutical and GMO authorization, the REACH authorization procedure is identified as a typical case of implementation incongruence. By applying process tracing, I analyze the mechanisms linking the causal condition (decision sequence and clearing points) with the observed outcome (implementation incongruence).