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Understanding the Patterns of Lobbying during the Implementation of EU Policies

European Politics
European Union
Interest Groups
Cansarp Kaya
University of Zurich
Cansarp Kaya
University of Zurich

Abstract

Most studies on access of interest groups to national and supranational political institutions in the European Union (EU) focus on the decision-making stage; however, interest group lobbying during policy implementation is yet to be studied. This paper explores how different types of interest groups choose to use different channels of access during the implementation of EU policies. Our knowledge on interest group access is not enough to explain the interactions between interest groups and political actors at the “post-decision” stage of policy making on its own, because policy implementation has different characteristics than the earlier stages. Despite the continuous Europeanization of interest group lobbying and availability of communication channels with EU institutions, I argue that the level of domestic lobbying is higher than EU lobbying when EU policies are implemented in member states. Moreover, I claim that one can even see differences between legal transposition and practical application phases of policy implementation. While more organized interests (e.g. trade associations) have easier access to political institutions when EU directives are adapted to domestic needs during transposition, less organized interests (e.g. citizen groups) and individual lobbyists (e.g. firms) are better in monitoring actual practice of EU policies and use it to have better access to political institutions during practical application of EU law. The study makes use of the data collected from a large sample of interest groups residing or operating in the EU via an online survey. Controlling the size of their advocacy staff, the paper tests these hypotheses on access to European and domestic institutions during policy implementation and also inspects the lobbying strategies employed at this policy-making stage.