Delegated and Implementing Acts and the EU Accountability Conundrum

The Treaty of Lisbon has significantly reformed the so-called comitology system and a new distinction between delegated and implementing acts was introduced. Despite the attempt to define the scope and the distinction between the procedures – i.e. Case C-427/12, Commission v. Parliament and Council (Biocides)-, and the fact that different supervision and accountability mechanisms are supposed to operate, the system is still blurred and it causes important challenges for accountability both at the EU and national level. At the EU level, the new system has caused inter-institutional tensions and the EP tried to extend its powers of control. At the national level, the National parliaments lament the impossibility to check over those acts. After several deferments, the European Commission has finally launched the initiative to improve transparency in the process and the Programme on Better Regulations envisages different initiatives for enhancing legitimacy with regards to implementing and delegated acts. Moreover, in May 2015 the Commission also published a proposal for a new Inter-institutional agreement on Better Regulation (IIA), aimed at appeasing the emerged tensions among the EU institutions. Looking at both European and national level, the aim of this paper is to investigate the issue of democratic accountability and to examine if those new initiatives can improve the legitimacy conundrum of the EU with regard to the current provisions and practice of delegated and implementing decision making.