This paper evaluates whether an assertive position of national parliaments influenced outcomes of the EU-level negotiations on fiscal measures introduced during the 2010 to 2015 period. The starting point is provided by the database of the initial negotiating positions of member state governments on contested measures such as rescue packages for Greece or the Fiscal Compact. Such positions have been collected for the ongoing Horizon2020 project "The Choice for Europe since Maastricht". The paper analyzes whether parliaments such as those in Finland, Slovakia or the Netherlands advocated stances on contested measures that helped their governments to win concessions on the EU level shifting the final EU compromise closer towards their starting position and thus contributing to differentiation. Moreover, the paper also evaluates whether these assertive positions can be traced to some specific provision in the national legal system that provides additional leverage to the national parliaments or whether it was merely a consequence of some specific political constellation. Finally, the paper will discuss the empirical findings in the light of the theory of "demoicracy". In this respect the question is about whether national parliaments as organs of representation of national demoi foster differentiation rather than integration and hence national democracy rather than European demoicracy.
