The Impact of Eurozone Crisis on Direct Democracy

Member state governments have tried to avoid holding referendums on European integration in the recent years. The infamous rejection of the European Constitution in 2005, and the following Eurozone crisis which contributed to the rising Euroscepticism, led to the belief that EU referendums are hard to win. The findings of the existing literature support this idea as well because No campaigns can easily associate the referendum proposal with unpopular issues and play upon the existing fears of the public. This article questions this assumption and asks: Has the Eurozone crisis made it difficult for governments to win referendums on European integration? There have been three EU referendums since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis. Ireland held two subsequent referendums on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and 2009, and a third referendum on the European Fiscal Compact in 2012. The Lisbon Treaty referendums provide a unique test case because the first referendum was held just ahead of the crisis in 2008, and the second during the crisis in 2009. The outcomes are puzzling because the Irish rejected the treaty the first time and accepted it the second time in the thick of the Eurozone crisis. Contributing to the puzzle, the 2012 referendum passed seamlessly despite the crisis. The article argues that the answer lies in the campaign dynamics. Based on 50 in-depth interviews with campaigners and public opinion data, the analysis demonstrates that despite causing a drop in EU support, the Eurozone crisis also provided governments with an opportunity to control the ‘risk factor’ in referendum campaigns, by exploiting worst-case scenarios that might unfold in the case of a No vote. This implies that referendum results, and consequently the future of European integration, depend on the ways in which national politicians present the vote to their public and legitimize EU-level decisions.