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Public Opinion, Trust, and the Social Investment State – Evidence from a New Survey

Public Policy
Representation
Social Policy
Welfare State
Family
Education
Erik Neimanns
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies – MPIfG
Marius Busemeyer
Universität Konstanz
Julian Garritzmann
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Erik Neimanns
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies – MPIfG

Abstract

Is the turn in some countries towards social investment (SI) reflected in public attitudes? To what extent are policymakers reforming welfare states towards SI responsive to their voters and in how far do they have leeway for implementing such reforms operating under severe fiscal constraints? This paper presents for the first time evidence of an original survey of public opinion on education and other SI policies in eight European countries. We explore how citizens react to the framing of different types of fiscal trade-offs. We analyze how public support for SI varies depending on the type of SI (education and family policies) and whether this support depends on which policy cutbacks would be accepted in order to finance SI-spending (unemployment benefits and pensions). We furthermore probe how trade-offs between different types of social spending are related to trade-offs in financing this spending now (via taxes) or in the future (via public debt). Drawing on recent analysis in other policy areas (Jacobs/Matthews 2012, 2015), we argue that people’s acceptance of welfare state reform depends on their political and social trust: People who trust in politicians and political institutions will be much more likely to accept long-term policy reforms, such as a change from a compensatory to a social investment state. Social trust, however, also plays a role, as it increases support for means-tested compensatory policies that are subject to potential abuse by recipients. We find that support for SI drops considerably when these investments would be financed via cutbacks in other parts of the welfare state. We also find significant variation across policy fields as well as across welfare state regimes. Trust in society and trust in government seem to play an important, but non-trivial role in explaining this pattern and in enhancing our understanding of SI and welfare state reforms.