The diffusion of Central Bank independence (CBI) since the 1990’s is one of the most striking examples of delegation processes around the world. Yet, the medium and long-term political consequences of an independent central bank are not known and anticipated by decision-makers during the delegation. The consequences of this lack of control of the delegation process can be studied and analyzed in the case of the European Central Bank (ECB) during the financial crisis. Indeed, one of the theoretical assumption of the CBI theories is that the monetary and economic fields should be strictly separated and thus, the central bank should be granted restrictive monetary missions and a complete autonomy to achieve them. However, a financial crisis blurs the separation between the monetary and economic fields and the institutional features granted to protect the central bank’s independence trigger unexpected consequences. This communication address these challenges by specifying why the delegation process cannot be controlled by principals, then the political consequences of the independence status of the ECB within the EU is analyzed and finally, some prospective conclusions are proposed in order to understand why the ECB high level of independency has not been yet criticized despite its extension of responsibilities.
