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The Anthropocene, Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, and the Abandonment of Liberal Neutrality

Human Rights
Social Justice
Freedom
Political theory
Fiachra O'Brolchain
Dublin City University
Fiachra O'Brolchain
Dublin City University

Abstract

Many of the ethical debates regarding anthropogenic climate change take place within a philosophical framework forged during the Enlightenment, which in turn inform our political perspective and options. The problems posed by climate change are global in nature and cross-generational in reach, and stretch the conceptual resources of Enlightenment philosophies. Our social practices – from trade to technological development – are evaluated and assessed within this framework. The political solutions to climate change are thus distorted by being framed within Enlightenment presuppositions that no longer apply to the condition in which 21st century humanity finds itself. This does not imply that a radical new philosophy is required. The normative framework governing the global response to climate change, and, in particular the development of new technologies, can be adapted. A framework suitable for the climate change problem is available in Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, which provides a recent example of an attempt to adapt liberal contract theory so that it is more sensitive to issues that were previously overlooked. The aim of this paper is to explore whether the capabilities approach as articulated by Nussbaum necessitates the abandonment of liberal neutrality and comprehensive theories of value, at least where the environment is concerned. Nature and other species form elements of the capabilities list, and thus must be considered elements of a minimal account of (liberal) justice. The specific focus of this paper is to analyse whether this can be considered a comprehensive doctrine, including an overall theory of value, with implications for normative ethics and politics. I will argue current state of knowledge about climate change, and the relatively precarious status of human life on the planet, provides us with a metaphysical grounding for an ethical theory of a minimal good and thus necessitates the abandonment of liberal neutrality.