Negotiating TTIP: The Impact of Transparency on Informal Working Practices in EU Trade Negotiations

Recent experiences with international trade agreements, like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), have shown how previously uncontroversial negotiations can suddenly spark large-scale public protests. People all over the European Union are rallying for more transparency in the Union's internal decision-making process about such trade negotiations. While EU decision-makers are now giving in to these demands, it remains to be seen whether the newly developed transparency-strategy of the European Commission will truly lessen the high degree of secrecy that has traditionally characterized internal working practices. EU decision-making on trade agreements has always been a highly secluded process, ranging from expert discussions in technical working groups to high-level informal lunches and dinners. Under what conditions can transparency demands from the EU public change this status quo – not a self-evident assumption in EU trade policy, and in how far has the demand been effective in reducing secrecy in the negotiations? Observers from other fields have noted how decision-making procedures do not automatically become less secretive after efforts were made to increase transparency and participation. To the contrary: informal and secretive practices seem to be on the rise in international and national contexts. Explanations in trade policy research draw on increasing complexity and sensitivity of the matters under negotiation, as well as the necessity to keep one’s negotiation strategy confidential vis-à-vis the external trade partner. The proposed paper gives an overview of the informal structures of EU decision-making in trade negotiations and the impact of the recent developments in the TTIP negotiations on the decision-making process. The original empirical material exists of interviews, fieldwork notes, and document analysis probing into former and contemporary working practices.