Why do some coalition cabinets terminate early and others are able to run until the end of the legislative term? There is not only cross-country, but also diachronic variation in cabinet duration (see e.g. Saalfeld 2008). In this paper I analyze if control mechanisms such as comprehensive coalition agreements lower the risk of early government termination. Previous research on cabinet termination mainly focused on the impact of cabinet characteristics that were determined at the time of government formation. Hence, I add to the field of cabinet termination by analyzing the link between coalition governance and coalition termination. Knowing when and why cabinets terminate early is important because low levels of cabinet duration might have serious consequences for government performance and the stability of a political system. My main argument is that coalition agreements can increase the stability of coalition cabinets as they lower the probability of intra-cabinet conflict. According to Müller and Strøm (2008, p. 170) coalition agreements are “the most binding, written statements to which the parties of a coalition commit themselves […]”. They can increase the stability of coalition governments by settling divisive issues even before coalition parties enter executive office or by specifying procedures to settle potentially arising conflicts throughout the legislative term. Assuming that the length of a coalition agreement signals its comprehensiveness, I further argue that the risk of early government termination should be lower, the longer the coalition agreement. The theoretical expectations will be empirically evaluated on the basis of a newly compiled comprehensive dataset on cabinet duration and control mechanisms in coalition governments. Drawing on event history analysis, the effect of coalition agreements on cabinet duration will be tested for approximately 400 coalition cabinets from 1945 until 2015 in 25 West and East European countries. The results will have important implications for our understanding of the interaction between coalition governance and coalition termination.
