In early 2012, the United States announced it will withdraw two of its four remaining brigade combat teams from Europe. This latest step in the gradual, 20-year drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe will ultimately result in an Army presence on the continent of roughly 37,000 soldiers. This may appear to be a significant remaining presence, but many of those soldiers work in sustainment functions, such as transportation or other logistical support tasks, supporting U.S. and allied operations well beyond Europe. The dwindling levels of U.S. infantry, artillery, armor, combat aviation, military police, signal, and intelligence units threaten to make the maintenance of interoperability with and among America’s most important allies impossible, especially as operations in Afghanistan wind down.
In recognition of this, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta also announced in early 2012 several ‘parting gifts’ for the Europeans. Among these were an air detachment to be based in Poland and four Aegis-capable ships to be based in Spain. But of greater importance from an interoperability perspective was the commitment to rotate a battalion-sized Army task force to Germany for exercises and training with European partners. The first of periodic four-month rotations is slated to occur in the spring of 2013.
The commitment to rotate forces to Europe was certainly welcomed by the European allies as well as those within the epistemic community who were pessimistic regarding the operational implications of continued American drawdown in Europe. Yet it remains unclear whether the rotational model will be sufficient to generate the level of interoperability necessary for U.S. forces and those of its most capable European allies to work seamlessly across the range of military operations. This paper will explore theses challenges and assess the way ahead.
