Party support for direct democratic procedures is counterintuitive at first glance: From a strategic perspective, political elites should be careful to expand citizen participation in the decision making process since they would undermine their control of the legislative agenda and an important source of power. Yet empirical evidence demonstrates that political elites in industrialized countries show increased willingness to introduce direct democratic procedures or to use the available constitutional mechanisms for the first time. But what motives do they pursue in this regard?
The rational choice approach offers an intriguing explanation for reform willingness in the field of electoral systems: Political elites seek reforms expecting short or long term benefits in the power distribution for their party. Thus, at second glance, institutional reforms present a welcome opportunity for political elites to form the rules of the legislative game to their advantage. Considering direct democratic procedures, political elites can expect in the long term a new possibility to influence legislative output; this is especially relevant for actors disadvantaged through the existing legislative structures. In the short term, reform willingness can improve the popularity of the involved parties and thus has an effect on their electoral performance. A contrasting position to the strategical explanation of reform willingness is presented in a cultural-ideological view: Parties differ in their policy programs and views on the ideal democratic system based on their ideological composition. Therefore, the support for direct democratic procedures can also be linked to the ideological beliefs and general values of political elites.
The paper examines the motives for direct democratic reforms in connection with the legislative process and electoral performance. The focus lies on the rational strategic explanation of the support for direct democracy considering the cultural-ideological influences as a competing explanation. The general assumption is that support for democratic reforms is related to the current distribution of legislative power and thus, changing electoral performance of parties should result in a change of the support for direct democratic procedures. In contrast, the ideological explanation assumes a constant position of parties and their representatives towards democratic reforms over time as it is based on strong and stable ideological ties.
These assumptions are tested using four consecutive studies on parliamentary candidates in Germany in the period from 2002 till 2013 which are part of the German Longitudinal Election Study (component 6) and the forerunner studies. The dataset offers a natural variation of power constellations, as the governing coalitions changed in the four examined electoral periods. Each electoral period is analyzed separately to compare the effects of electoral performance on support for direct democracy. Additionally, a pooled analysis combining all periods will be performed. In this way, the paper contributes to the debate on legislative reforms and furthermore advances the understanding of the relation between political elites and their party.
