Through constitutional and legislative adjudication courts frequently end up examining the political and legal questions at the heart of peace agreements. Where a peace agreement has included territorial self-government provisions courts are often endowed with the capacity to adjudicate disputes between state and sub-state levels of government. The effectiveness of courts in fulfilling this role as not been comprehensively examined. Judicial review traditionally operates to buttress established concepts of order, community, and stability but in transitional settings these concepts are commonly not developed or fully accepted. The independence and the neutrality of the judiciary may also be contested and necessary expertise may be lacking.
This article examines the role of the judiciary in adjudicating disputes over central government and sub-state level competencies in two post-conflict cases – Bosnia and Moldova. It finds that courts have largely been ineffectual in their role as arbiters. In Bosnia a general disregard for the rule of law among politicians and in Moldova weak technical capacity in the sub-state government have largely undermined the potentially positive role that the judiciary in both states could play in upholding and developing the post-conflict political institutions.
