Why would states give up their nuclear weapons, as such diminishing their relative power? Explaining why some states disarm while others choose not to do so is a rising concern for scholars of International Relations. More recently, some studies have emphasized norms and ideas (e.g. Katzenstein, 1996; Tannenwald, 2007) or internal factors such as domestic coalitions and leader psychology (e.g. Hymans, 2006) instead of technology and security considerations as key drivers for states to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons (Rublee, 2009). However, explaining nuclear disarmament has been difficult for existing international theory, which has few tools for allowing norms to evolve over their life cycle, to be linked with related norms, and for explaining why norms are important for states’ behaviour (Freedman, 2013).
Nuclear weapons have not be used since the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (non-use norm), while during the Cold War nuclear powers have used prudential rationale for not using them against an opponent who also has a nuclear arsenal (deterrence norm). Consequently, the perils imposed by their spread led nuclear-weapons states (NWS) to create legal and normative mechanisms to prevent nuclear weapons from proliferating to any other actors (nonproliferation norm). Later, with the initial signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and the inclusion of its Article VI as a commitment for States to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” reflected the desire of the non-nuclear-weapons States (NNWS) not to create a regime that would allow NWS to retain their weapons in perpetuity. Ever since the pursuit of nuclear disarmament – both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a world without nuclear weapons – has been a central component of the NPT regime. Since the end of the Cold War – despite of non-NPT States such as Israel, North Korea, India and Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons – adherence to the Treaty has grown with other States coming to see the nuclear nonproliferation regime itself as an important guiding principle in their behaviour. In discussing whether all states might adopt total disarmament as an international norm, this paper argues that a constructivist approach is necessary to address this puzzle. By developing a typology of norms related to the possession and use of nuclear weapons, the paper develops a framework for charting the evolution of the disarmament norm and explaining case studies responding to the evolving norm. Two features of the norm are crucial to explaining specific instances of norm adherence: first, the relationship between nuclear disarmament and other well-established norms (non-use, deterrence, nonproliferation); and, second, the normative element of the disarmament norm. Particularly with respect to normative element, if it is known what influenced states like South Africa to disarm, it will improve the possibility of prioritizing the nuclear disarmament norm elsewhere as well as its universal acceptance.
